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FOREIGN POLICY AND THE NEW ADMINISTRATION 
Speech of Senator Mike Mansfia ld (D., Montana) to b~ d~livar~d at the 
Duqu~sne University Law Alumni Banquet 
Monday, April 24, 1961 
8 p.m. 
Pittsb~rgh, Pennsylvania 
The r esponsibility for the conduct of our relations with 
other nations rests only uith the Administration in power. The 
President assumes this r-asponsibility \lhen he takas offica on January 
20th. But foreign policy does not com~ to an end with ona Administra-
tion and begin ane'~ \<lith the next. Tha slate is not wiped clean ev~ry 
four years. There is a cont;.nuity of the problems 11h ich confront the 
nation from abroad and a continuity of the respons~s of Ol' r government 
to these problems from one Ad~inistration to another. 
This is not to say that a partic : lar Administration will not 
stamp the course of foreign policy with the brand of its own ideas. 
The process, however, is a slo~ one . It is slo~ partly bacausa the 
problems which we fac~ abroad are not of our exclusiv~ creation and, 
hence, are not amenable to our exclusive remedias. And, partly, it is 
slo,., because the impact of the ideas of a ne'~ Administration must per-
meate a larg~ and compl ~x bureaucracy Hithin o Jr m·m government before 
they make themselves felt in action on the problems to ,,hich they are 
directed. 
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We can grasp the significance of this continuity in foreign 
policy by reference to recent events in Cuba and in Laos. In the one 
instance, President Kennedy had urged an Alliance for Progress of all 
the American Republics. Within this concept, he presented a broad and 
cohesive outline for a cooperative advance in the relations of the 
nations of the Western Hemiephere. The presentation was well - received 
by other Republics of the Americas. New vistas of common benefit were 
opened by it. 
Nevertheless, within tiinety days of the President's taking 
office we were not yet at the beginning of this peaceful advance but 
rather face-to-face with a military crisis in Cuba brought about by 
the launching of an invasion of anti - Castro forces. Instead of being 
in a position to move forward on a new constructive approach to all of 
Latin America, the Administration was compelled to direct its attention 
to a critical juncture in our relations with one nation of the region. 
This juncture ~vas reached during this Administration. But 
the roads leading to it began many months ago. The juncture represented 
the culmination of an accumulation of hostility on the part of Cuba to 
this nation and an accumulation of our responses to that hostility. 
On the other side of the globe, in Laos, something similar 
has transpired. In fact, this situation had already reached the point 
of crisis even before the new Administration took office. It had reached 
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this stage because in preceding years a peaceful land, once remote 
from the rest of the world, had been turned into a bone of contention 
in the larger cla:>h of ideologies and po,.,er elsewhere in the world. 
As a result the people of Laos who until recent years had scarcely 
ever heard a shot fired in anger found themselves the focal point 
of steadily converging military forces from outside. Military clashes 
in Laos which produced the immediate crisis involved but a handful of 
men. But these clashes opened fissures vlith large implications for 
,.rorld peace. 
The direct involvement of the Soviet Union in Laos as a 
supplier of military aid to Laotian factions was one factor in produc -
ing the crisis and a factor of comparatively recent vintage. But it 
was preceded by the involvement of the Chinese- supported North 
Vietnamese government for a long time in a similar role. The sum total 
of this outside corr.munist - involvement in the local Laotian situation 
and its progressive enlargement is not measurable. But our own progres-
sive involvement will give us some insight into the process by ,.,hich 
the Laotians were plucked from the obscurity of remote Southeast Asia 
and steadily moved into a focus of world-to~ide significance. 
(.Jhen I first visited Laos in 1953, there were only 2 American. 
junior officials in the entire country. There was no aid program to 
and, 
speak of/ may I add, no Laotian army to speak of, to aid . But 
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seven years later, by the time the Laotian crisis broke in full force 
in the very last days of the Eisenhower Administration, there were in 
Laos hundreds of u.s. officials of several agencies and departoents. 
We had expended hundreds of millions of dollars on aid, largely for 
military purposes. We had financed the training of thousands of Laotian 
soldiers. And, finally, our O\~ naval and other forces had converged in 
the general vicinity of Laos because of the steady advance of communist-
oriented Laotians in the country . This vast commitment of our resources, 
not unlike that cf th2 Communists, had little to do with either the needs 
or realities of the situation in Laos. It had much to do with winning 
hollow propaganda victories in the cold war . 
To this situation, too, President Kennedy brought new ideas. 
In specifics he worked with the United Kingdom and India in an effort 
to bring about a cease-fire and the neutralization of Laos . In other 
words, he sought to take Laos out of the col d war. Left to their own 
devices, the Laotian people would ask for nothing more. From the point 
of view of the great powers this solution would mark a significant step 
towards a mor e rational world situation, one which anyone of them could 
take in the interests of peace with little, if any, sacrifice of significant 
national interests. 
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The initial Soviet reacticn to this proposal seemed favorable 
enough. Hevertheless, in the uorking out of the details through the 
existing channels of cl.iplonacy, veeks of delay have ensued. 
All the uhile, professions of the desire for peace in Laos 
have continued and all the uhile, the fighting has continued in that 
country. All the ,.,hile, the jockeying for some assumed advantage has 
gone on by much the same responses 'l'rith 'l'rhich this situation has been 
dealt for years. 
The crises in Laos and Cuba reveal vividly the continuity 
of both the problems and responses in foreign policy and the difficul-
ties of altering either overnight. Hithout uishing to dovrngrade the 
seriousness of either situation, I must emphasize, however, that they 
are but a fractional part of a larger picture. Behind Cuba stands the 
vast panorama of continuing difficulties and a continuing inadequacy 
of response to them Hith respect to all of Latin America. Yet this far 
more significant picture ca.l'l be overlooked in a fixation on the sensa-
tional developments ''ithin the troubled island just ninety miles off 
our shores. He have managed to live ''lith a militantly hostile Cuba 
for tvro years. I do not believe vre could live very well for tuo days 
vith a militantly hostile latin Al!lerica. 
Yet, vrhat has happened in Cuba under Castro can occur in 
other Latin American countries. The seed of Castroism is compounded 
of ruthless totalitarian technique plus messianic indigenous leadership, 
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plus support from outside this Hemisphere. It is doubtful that this 
seed can grow except in the soil of social and economic discontent. 
Unfortunately such soil covers much of Latin America, from the Caribbean 
shores down the great spine of the Andes. 
It is at least conceivable that this Hemisphere can be insulated 
from 
from a flow/without of material support to totalitarian forces within 
but the task would be immensely difficult and costly and of only limited 
efficacy. It is not conceivable, hm-rever, that in this day and age of 
instant and easy communications, this Hemisphere can be isolated from 
the transference of totalitarian techniques from elsewhere. Nor can 
the appearance of messianic indigenous leadership in Latin American 
countries be forestalled because what is indigenous to Latin America is 
by definition beyond the control of this nation. 
If it is to our interests-"and it is--to prevent the spread of 
a d).visive and hostile totalitarianism throughout the Hemisphere, there 
is one point at which a check may be feasible. That point is where a 
cooperative effort with others renders the soil of the Americas infertile 
to the seed of totalitarianism before it takes root . And in substance, 
that is the idea which the President expressed in such comprehensive 
form a fel-7 weeks ago in his speech on an Alliance for Progress in the 
I.Jestern Hemisphere. It is one thing to advance this idea. It is another 
to bring it to fruition--to promote that economic and social progress 
which alone promises the removal of the acids of mass discontent from 
the soil of this He~isphere. 
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There uas much to do .1ith respect to social and economic 
conditions in Latin Amarica before this Administration took offica. 
After the recent davelopments in Cuba there is still much to do. Time 
was short when this Administration took over. Now it may b~ even shorter. 
If the situation in Latin America is to b~ altarad so that it 
will no longar provida an incubus for totalitarianism then a great affort 
m'JSt be made along the lines of tha allianca for progress proposal \-lhich 
the Presidant has advancad and that effort mJst begin to take concreta 
for m in the very near futu:re. The effort, moreover, must ba a coopera-
tive one because the stake of Latin Amaricans is far greater and more 
direct than our 0~10 and, in great part, tha situation is amenable to 
change only as Latin Americans are viill:l.ng to change it. But if thay 
are willing to do what must be done for freedom and progress within 
their own countries, then the stake of this nation in the future of this 
He·1isphere is such that vie must bG prepared to join with them in the 
effort. I know that the President is so prepared. Are the rest of us 
also preparad? If wa, no less than the Latin Am~ricans, are willing to 
face th~ dimensions of the difficulties and act in concert on them, than 
the Presidant's ideas of an Alliance for Prograss can be and will ba in-
terpret~d into effective action . 
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Not unlilce Cuba, the crisis in laos is but the visible tip of 
a vast iceberg involving the mainland of lfestern Asia. It is not only 
in Laos that the conditions of peace do not yet r;xist . We may see them, 
there,now in striking form. But if we look beneath the tip, ue will 
see that the difficulties which confront us, particularly, fork out from 
Laos into Thailand and even more so into Viet Nam. Nor do they and at 
the sea off Southeast Asia. The conditions of peace in any reliable sense 
do not exist at Fonnosa or in Korea any more than in Viet Nam or Laos. 
In all of these situations, the ne't-r Administration begins with what may 
best be described as the response of the holding action. Such stability 
as exists in them, in part, is knitted together with huge aid-programs 
of one kind or another, backed with a heavy deployment of our own military 
forces in the general area. 
At best, these situations will remain uncertain for some time 
to come. At best, the response which we have heretofore given to them 
will have to be continued for some time to come. It is not yet clear to 
what extent these situations can be altered in the direction of a more 
durable and less costly peace by n~re effective diplomacy but I am con-
fident that the President will not hesitate to bring to bear ne"t-r ideas 
to that end. l-ie shall not kno't-r the possibilities until ideas have been 
tested and, I may add, that this testing has already begun in Laos. 
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It will be a cautious process- -this testing- -because the 
Pr~sid3nt is a prudent man who has uppermost in mind the security of this 
nation. It will be a slow process for reasons which I have already set 
forth . But if it is possible to achieve a more stable and less costly 
peace in the Far East, I know that the President will leave no stone un-
turned in his efforts tv achieve it. 
What applies to Latin America and to the Southeast Asia and the 
Far East, applies also to Europe and to Africa. We have been involved 
deeply in the problems of the former for a long time. In the last year 
or two we have become involved significantly in the problems of the 
latter. I shall not, today, go into the details of the situation which 
confronts us on these continents. Nevertheless, I would point out by 
way of example that the division of Berlin and Germany has not disappeared 
with the advent of a new Administration. Nor have the weaknesses in NAXO 
dissolved merely because we have installed a new President . Nor have 
the Eastern European nations yet obtained that degree of national freedom of 
action which permits a full measure of contact with Western Europe, a con-
dition which must prevail if there is to be a sound peace on that continent. 
I shall not go into detail, either, on the vastly complicated 
problems of trying to bring control over the weapons of mass destruction 
and a measure of r eduction in the great burden of taxation on our people 
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and all peoples vrhich is entailed in bilhons upon billions of armaments 
expenditures. These problems vrere complex on the day this Administration 
took office. They grov more complex as each day passes 1-ri thout the be-
ginnings of a solution. 
As with Latin America and Southeast Asia, the President may be 
expected to bring to bear nevr ideas on all of these problems of foreign 
policy which he inherits. Indeed, some ideas already have been initiated. 
The process of making these ideas effective, however, is, as I have already 
noted, at best a slow one. After years of close observation, moreover, I 
am .personally persuaded that the machinery o:f this process vri thin the 
Executive Branch of this government has grown so cumbersome and ineffective 
that there is grave danger to the principle of responsible leadership by 
the President. I would hope, therefore, that this Administration would 
proceed promptly to a thorough overhaul of the machinery of intelligence 
which functions in many Departments and Agencies in a fashion vrhich deeply 
influences foreign policy and its conduct. 
I 1·rould hope, further, that the machinery for the countless 
secondary decisions of policy through which the President's ideas and 
-t.(_,~ 
primary decisions~would be thoroughly overhauled and streamlined and 
that the preponderant responsibility in these matters 1·rould be lodged 
,.,here it has not been for many years--in the office of the Secretary of 
State. 
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The difficulties which ,.,e face in the world are immense. 
The responsibility of the President in connection "lith them are 
enormous. He carries the ultimate burden for all of us - Democrats 
and Republicans alike. He has a right to expect general support in 
these matters, a support which must include, may I say, constructive 
criticism in matters of foreign policy. 
I want to say that he has had that kind of support in Congress 
for the first three months that he has been in office. He has had it 
from Democrats and Republicans alike. I am confident that he has it 
and ,.,ill continue to have it from the people of the U•1ited States . 
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